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Abstract
Due to popularity surge social networks became lucrative
targets for spammers and guerilla marketers, who are trying
to game ranking systems and broadcast their messages at
little to none cost. Ranking systems, for example Twitter’s
Trends, can be gamed by scripted users also called bots, who
are automatically or semi-automatically twitting essentially
the same message. Judging by the prices and abundance
of supply from PR firms this is an easy to implement
and widely used tactic, at least in Russian blogosphere.
Aggregative analysis of social networks should at best mark
those messages as spam or at least correctly downplay their
importance as they represent opinions only of a few, if
dedicated, users. Hence bot detection plays a crucial role
in social network mining and analysis.
In this paper we propose technique called RepRank
which could be viewed as Markov chain based model for rep-
utation propagation on graphs utilizing simultaneous trust
and anti-trust propagation and provide effective numerical
approach for its computation.
Comparison with another models such as
TrustRank and some of its modifications on sample
of 320000 Russian speaking Twitter users is presented. The
dataset is presented as well.
Keywords. Antispam, social graph, Markov chain,
trustrank.
1 Introduction
While concepts of ’good’ and ’bad’ are quite complex
and may be considered subjective, applied to spam
filtration problems they are mapped to ’signal’ and
’noise’ correspondingly and became objective enough to
build algorithms upon.
The following assumption, proposed in [1] was
successfully used in graph based antispam algorithms:
Assumption 1 (Approximate isolation of the
good set)
Good graph vertices rarely link to the bad ones.
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This assumption leads to trust propagation scheme
proposed in [1]: pages linked from good ones are almost
good, the pages linked from those are slightly worse
and so on. There is a similar approach to mistrust
propagation [2]: pages linking to bad pages are almost
bad, the pages linking to those pages may be slightly
better and so on. The main difference being trust
propagates forward (by graph edges direction) and
mistrust propagates backward.
TrustRank and other similar models for signal
propagation on graphs can be viewed in random walker
framework with random walkers carrying signal. In
case of TrustRank it is trust charge equal to current
vertex trust value. For some vertices marked by external
verification process (also called oracle function) walkers
with a priory set probability α take charge equal to 1
and with probability 1−α take charge equal to current
charge of the vertex. Stationary distribution of such
process with initial distribution vector d with di = 1
if i-th vertex marked by the oracle as a good one and
di = 0 otherwise is gives us TrustRank scores for whole
graph:
(1.1) t = αFt+ (1− α)d,
here F is forward transition matrix which is column
normalized adjacency matrix.
The logical continuation of TrustRankand anti-
TrustRankis the combination of both models. Major
advantage of combined trust and mistrust propagation
approach is the ability to use both positive and negative
signals.
[4] uses this approach by penalizing trust and
distrust propagation form from not trustworthy and
trustworthy vertices correspondingly. [3] is analogous
to [4], but stated in probabilistic framework.
In this paper we further pursue the idea of simulta-
neous trust and mistrust propagation. In contrast with
above-mentioned papers we combine trust and mistrust
providing unified reputation score, called RepRank.
2 Proposed model
To each graph vertex we attach a trust score witch is
negative for bad vertices and positive for a good ones.
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Denote by t+ and t− vectors obtained by zero-
ing negative and positive components in vector t cor-
respondingly. Then, we search trust distribution t to
satisfy
(2.2) t = α1Ft+ + α2Bt− + α3d,
where B is backward transition matrix which is column
normalized transposed adjacency matrix. The solution
of (2.2) we will call RepRank. It exists, unique and
continuously dependent on the initial distribution d (see
the Theorem 2.1 for more details). While usefulness of
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the equation
(2.2) solution is beyond doubt we want to point out, that
continuous dependence on oracle provided labeling d is
very nice as well. It protects RepRank from sudden
”everything you knew is wrong” changes caused be
addition of small portion of new data, mistakes and
typos (a manual labeling is very tedious and error prone
process). This follows natural intuition that once one
have an idea of everyone’s reputation a small changes
should only correct, not shake the foundations of his
worldview.
Theorem 2.1. Let F,B be n × n stochastic matrices
from (2.2), 0 < α1, α2, α3 < 1, P+ be an operator which
replaces all negative component of the n × 1 vector by
zeroes and P− be operator which replaces all positive
components of the n×1 vector by zeroes. Then mapping
R an n×1 vector d to the n×1 vector t that the solution
of the equation
(2.3) t = α1FP+(t) + α2BP−(t) + α3d,
has the next properties:
1. R(d) exists for any vector d from Rn.
2. R(d) is bijection mapping Rn to Rn.
3. R(d) is Lipschitz continuous mapping.
Proof:
One can use the following iterative process to find t:
t(k+1) = I(t(k)),
I(t) = α1FP+(t) + α2BP−(t) + α3d,
with any initial vector t0. The mapping I(t) is contrac-
tive on the metric space (Rn, ‖ · ‖1):
‖I(t1)− I(t2)‖1 =
= ‖α1F (P+(t1)− P+(t2))
+α2B(P−(t1)− P−(t2))‖1 ≤
≤ α1‖F‖1‖P+(t1)− P+(t2)‖1+
α2‖B‖1‖P−(t1)− P−(t2)‖1 ≤
≤ α1‖P+(t1)− P+(t2)‖1+
α2‖P−(t1)− P−(t2)‖1 ≤
≤ max(α1, α2)‖t1 − t2‖1,
where we used that ‖F‖1 = ‖B‖1 = 1 and
‖t1 − t2‖1 = ‖P+(t1)−P+(t2)‖1 + ‖P−(t1)−P−(t2)‖1.
So I(t) is contractive mapping with coefficient less
or equal to max(α1, α2) < 1 and Banach fixed-point
theorem guarantees the existence and uniqueness of
fixed point for it. Let us denote that fixed point by R(d)
and notice that it is the solution for equation (2.2).
Also R(d) is Lipschitz continuous mapping with
coefficient
α3
1−max(α1, α2) .
It can be proven in the following way:
R(d1)−R(d2) =
= α1F (P+(R(d1))− P+(R(d2)))+
+α2B(P−(R(d1))− P−(R(d2))) + α3(d1 − d2)
‖R(d1)−R(d2)‖1 ≤
≤ α1‖F‖1‖(P+(R(d1))− P+(R(d2)))‖1+
+α2‖B‖1‖(P−(R(d1))− P−(R(d2)))‖1+
+α3‖d1 − d2‖d2 ≤
≤ max(α1, α2)‖R(d1)−R(d2)‖1 + α3‖d1 − d2‖1,
therefore
‖R(d1)−R(d2)‖1 ≤ α3
1−max(α1, α2)‖d1 − d2‖1.
The mapping R(d) is injection because equality R(d1) =
R(d2) causes d1 = d2 in equation (2.2). It is also a
surjection because for any t ∈ Rn exists dt such that
dt =
1
α3
(t− α1FP+(t)− α2BP−(t)),
that equality R(dt) = t holds.
3 Experimental evaluation
For our experiments we recursively crawled twitter using
as seeds Russian speaking users we found in Twitter’s
Streaming API. For each user we downloaded all people
Algorithm Accuracy
RepRank 0.8833
TrustRank 0.851
anti-TrustRank 0.8636
Table 1: Experimental results
Figure 1: Connections between 300 vertices with highest
in-degree (left) and 300 most reputable vertexes (right).
Vertices not having connections within this group are
omitted.
he follows, ’friends’ in Twitter terminology. This friends
graph has 326130 vertices and 2713369 nodes. We
manually labeled 3124 users as spammers or a good
ones. 1
We did a cross-validation with random subsampling
splitting data set in two halves to test our algorithm
against other single-score trust propagation algorithms,
namely TrustRank and anti-TrustRank. The parame-
ters for each algorithm were chosen to maximize accu-
racy.
The results provided in the Table 1. As can be seen
our algorithm outperforms both TrustRank and anti-
TrustRank.
It is interesting to note, that Russian-speaking
part of Twitter is dominated by bots and spammers.
According to our algorithm, out of 326130 accounts
only 59691 (around 18%) are managed by humans.
Among those only 375 (around 0.1%) correspond to
high-reputation, profiles of prominent public figures,
government officials and organizations, reputable press
and so on (see reputation distribution on Figure 2).
Spammers are more active at following each other than
a normal people (see Figure 1). A serious anti-spam
effort is required if one wants to make use of Twitter’s
1The dataset can be obtained from
https://bitbucket.org/ovchinnikov/rutwitterdataset
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Figure 2: Distribution of reputation. RepRank score on
the x-axis and logarithm of number of accounts on the
y-axis. The gap is due to separation between masses and
a handful of celebrities who are following each other.
data, otherwise he will analyze noise, or worse, some
botmaster’s political views.
4 Conclusion and further work
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we
proposed new reputation propagation algorithm which
allows to use both bad and good vertices in its starting
set and outperforms analogues. Second, we gathered
a sample Russian Twitter social graph with manual
labeling of good and bad seeds.
Different normalization strategies along with regu-
larizations (pagerank-style teleportations) could be used
to further improve performance of proposed method.
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